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Abstract
We study a contract design setting in which the contracting parties cannot com-
mit not to renegotiate previous contract agreements. In particular, we characterize
the outcome functions that are implementable for an uninformed principal and an
informed agent if, having observed the agent's contract choice, the principal can oer
a new menu of contracts in its place. An outcome function can be implemented in
this setting if and only if it is optimal for the principal for some belief over agent
types which is more pessimistic, in the sense of the likelihood ratio order, than the
prior. Furthermore, the outcome function cannot be too sensitive to variations in
the agent's type. We show that the direct revelation mechanism which implements
such a function when renegotiation can be prevented will also implement it in any
equilibrium when it cannot, so the standard contract is robust to renegotiation.
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1 Introduction
One of the main messages of the literature on contract renegotiation is that an
inability of contracting parties to commit themselves not to renegotiate hurts those
parties because it limits the use of ex ante contracts and prevents desirable outcomes
from being implementable.
A leading example is the hold-up problem, in which investment that increases the
expected benet of a relationship is not undertaken because the investing party fears
expropriation of the investment benets by its partner. An ex ante contract specifying
the division of ex post surplus between contracting parties can serve to alleviate this
problem but its renegotiation will ultimately aect this division and hence damage
investment incentives. This problem has been studied in various settings (for example,
with symmetric information, asymmetric information, selsh investment, cooperative
investment) and has been shown in most cases to limit the scope of contracting and
decrease the level of investment; see for instance Segal (1999), Maskin and Moore
(1999), Che and Hausch (1999), Reiche (2006) and Goltsman (2011).
Renegotiation can also be harmful in situations in which a trading opportunity is
repeated several times and in which parties cannot commit not to renegotiate future
trade agreements; see for instance Dewatripont and Maskin(1990), Hart and Tirole
(1988) and Laont and Tirole (1988, 1990). In this context, the ratchet eect implies
that parties tend to understate the value of trade in order to avoid more demanding
schedules (for example, a higher price) in the future. Spot contracts or long-term
contracts which are vulnerable to renegotiation tend to be less ecient in solving the
asymmetric information problem between trading partners than long-term contracts
which cannot be renegotiated.
We consider a standard contracting problem between an uninformed principal
and a privately informed agent, and ask which outcome functions (mappings from
the agent's private information into some action and transfer payment) can be imple-
mented when parties cannot commit not to renegotiate their contract. More precisely,
we suppose that after the agent has played the initial mechanism, determining a de-
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fault outcome, the principal can oer a second-stage mechanism which, if the agent
accepts it, determines the actual outcome. This second mechanism will of course
depend on what the principal has learned from her interaction with the agent in
the initial mechanism and we can consequently not assume that the agent's initial
message fully reveals his type. That is, the standard revelation principle does not
apply.
Most of the literature on contract renegotiation is concerned only with implement-
ing the outcome function which is optimal for the principal at the stage when the
mechanism is played (see, for example, Skreta (2006) or Bester and Strausz (2001)).
In our setting this outcome function is simple to implement, as is the ex post ecient
one. However, in many contexts (such as the hold-up context mentioned above) this
is not the best outcome function to implement. Our aim is to characterize all outcome
functions that can be implemented subject only to the agent's incentive and partic-
ipation constraints and the constraint of subsequent renegotiation. What outcome
functions are optimal will depend on the particular circumstances; for instance, it will
depend on who designs the initial mechanism, whether the principal or an outside
agency such as a social planner.
If the designer is the principal she might, as in the hold-up problem, want to pro-
pose ex ante a mechanism to improve investment incentives. This will not, in general,
be the same as the one which is optimal for her once investment is undertaken and
the state of the world is realized. At this point the initial purpose of the mechanism
is served and the parties will have an incentive to renegotiate the existing contract.
In the next Section we outline our results in the context of a specic example of this
kind. Alternatively, the principal might want to propose a mechanism to attract a
specic pool of agents, so that the initial mechanism has to satisfy some particular
set of participation constraints. If, once an agent is locked in with the principal,
those participation constraints have changed, the principal has an incentive to oer a
dierent contract at the second stage. In both cases, the principal's optimal ex ante
mechanism taking these considerations into account may not be the same one which
she would wish to oer ex post.
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If the designer is an outside agency he may be, for example, a regulator, or a higher
level of authority in the organization to which the principal belongs, or the designer
of a trading platform or a market where sellers (principals) and buyers (agents) who
do not know each other are matched. In each of these cases, the designer may have
an objective function which diers from those of the players, though the arguments
of the function may include the principal's expected payo and/or the distribution of
utilities and decisions across the various types of agent.
The above considerations imply that it is desirable to know which outcome func-
tions can be implemented when renegotiation is taken into account. Our rst re-
sult says that any r-implementable (i.e., implementable with renegotiation) outcome
function must satisfy a simple renegotiation-invariance property, which can be in-
terpreted as a modication of the revelation principle. Namely, if an outcome is
r-implementable with some initial mechanism it can also be achieved by giving the
parties, at the outset, the same direct revelation mechanism which would implement
it in the no-renegotiation case. Moreover, after each announcement by the agent, the
principal, in equilibrium, oers the same direct revelation mechanism again. In the
no-renegotiation case, the agent would tell the truth in this initial mechanism but,
because of the ratchet eect, this is not so in the renegotiation case. Instead, the
agent will understate his type, i.e., randomize over announcements of types below his
true type. The principal, after a particular announcement ^, say, will therefore have
post-announcement beliefs that are distributed over types ^ and above, and these
beliefs are such that the initial direct revelation mechanism now becomes optimal for
her. In this second stage mechanism the agent will then tell the truth and obtain the
outcome intended for his type. We also show that this equilibrium is unique.
Because the agent always understates his true type in the initial mechanism, the
principal's possible beliefs at the renegotiation stage are, in a particular sense, more
pessimistic than her prior beliefs. Our second main result says that an outcome
function is r-implementable if and only if it is optimal, for the principal, for some
distribution which is lower than her prior in the likelihood ratio order.
Since the principal's beliefs are related to the outcome function through the rst-
4
order condition of her maximization problem at renegotiation, we can express this
result in terms of the slope of the decision function. Since we assume supermodularity
of the agent's payo function, the decision function, as in the no-renegotiation case,
cannot be decreasing. We show that, in addition, it cannot be too steep: our third
main result is that an outcome function is r-implementable if and only if it does
not vary too much with the agent's type, in the sense that the slope of the decision
function must be below a certain bound.
In summary, for a large class of decision rules, the standard incentive-compatible
mechanism has a strong renegotiation-invariance property - after any message, the
principal always wants to oer the initial mechanism again. The designer does not
have to be concerned about whether renegotiation might be possible - the same mech-
anism delivers the desired outcome for every type whether it is possible or not. Our
third result can easily be used to verify whether or not, in a particular applied setting,
renegotiation poses a problem because the desired decision rule falls outside the above
class. Another appealing feature is that an outside designer wishing to implement a
particular outcome function does not need to know the principal's prior distribution
over the agent's types, only that this distribution is above a certain lower bound in
the likelihood ratio order.
The results apply in addition to the case of interim, as opposed to ex post, renego-
tiation and also to a model in which the renegotiation has nitely many stages. Our
analysis does assume that the renegotiation bargaining game is nite. This could
be because there is an exogenous deadline such as may arise in many contexts (see,
e.g., Fuchs and Skrzypacz (2013)): for example, in a buyer-seller model, the good
might be perishable or needed as an input into a production process which cannot be
delayed. Alternatively, the agent may face nancial constraints which vary over time.
Another possibility is that a third party designs the mechanism and, while the princi-
pal is able to commit to a mechanism (as is generally assumed in the principal-agent
literature) the designer cannot fully commit the principal. We also briey discuss in
subsection 4.5 below possible extensions to a model of innite-horizon renegotiation
with discounting.
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Literature
Ex post renegotiation has been studied by Green and Laont (1987), Forges
(1994), and Neeman and Pavlov (2013). In these contributions the concepts employed
are variations on the principle that a mechanism is (ex post) renegotiation-proof if,
for any outcome x of the mechanism and any alternative outcome y, the players would
not vote unanimously for y in preference to x if a neutral third party were to propose
it to them. Such denitions of renegotiation-proofness have the merit that, if a given
mechanism satises it, the mechanism is robust against all possible alternative out-
comes. However, it also has the drawback that the implied renegotiation process does
not have a non-cooperative character. In contrast, we assume that the renegotiation
process is given by an explicit ex post bargaining game, a simple take-it-or-leave it
oer by the uninformed party. This one-shot model of renegotiation is close to the
one generally used for mechanism design with complete information (Maskin and
Moore (1999), Segal and Whinston (2002)), in which, for any inecient outcome of
the mechanism, there is a single renegotiation outcome, which can be predicted by
the players.3
A recent strand of the literature on the Coase Conjecture (see Strulovici (2014)
and Maestri (2013)) is concerned with contract negotiations with limited commitment
in which contracts are (re)negotiated using innite-horizon protocols with frictions.
As those frictions vanish the essentially unique equilibrium involves only ecient
contracts (see also Beaudry and Poitevin (1995) and Goltsman (2011)). Our focus
is dierent in that we are concerned with what can be achieved when there are non-
negligible frictions. Our results concern the case in which there is an exogenous
deadline, but, as we discuss in subsection 4.5, we conjecture that a version of our
results would apply in an innite-horizon model with (non-negligible) discounting.
None of the contributions in the literature, to our knowledge, has shown the
renegotiation-invariance property of standard incentive-compatible mechanisms, or
derived our results about the relation between the prior and the possible post-renegotiation
3Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1992) model renegotiation as costly because it involves delay and
show that the set of implementable outcomes in a complete information buyer-seller model is larger
than those of the standard model of implementation with renegotiation.
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beliefs.
Finally, our analysis is indirectly related to the literature on incomplete informa-
tion bargaining beginning with Fudenberg and Tirole (1983). One interpretation of
a mechanism is that it is a device for understanding what can be achieved by non-
cooperative bargaining games; see for instance Ausubel and Deneckere (1989a) and
(1989b). In contrast to these papers, we consider what a mechanism can achieve when
it is played before parties enter into such a bargaining game. In addition, we con-
sider general revelation mechanisms and not simply price oers. It is also related to
recent work on organizational theory, stemming from Crawford and Sobel (1982). In
Krishna and Morgan (2008) the uninformed decision maker can commit to a contract
which pays the informed sender a monetary transfer which depends on the message
sent, but cannot commit to the action which she then takes. In our setting the sender
is the agent and the decision maker is the principal, who can only partially commit
to her action (the renegotiation mechanism). See also Ottaviani (2000) for a model
with informed senders, monetary transfers and lack of commitment by the receiver.
Outline
Section 2 contains several examples to motivate and demonstrate our analysis.
Section 3 sets out the model formally. Section 4 contains the analysis and results. Sub-
section 4.1 proves the renegotiation-invariance principle, which is helpful in deriving
the necessary and sucient conditions. Subsection 4.2 derives necessary conditions
for implementation. Subsection 4.3 provides sucient conditions and a discussion
of the strong implementation (uniqueness) result. Subsection 4.4 discusses the spe-
cial case in which utility is linear. Subsection 4.5 contains a discussion of several
applications and our main assumptions. Some of the proofs are in the Appendix.
2 Examples
In this section we outline one setting to which our analysis applies and use some
simple examples to illustrate our main arguments and results. The setting features ex
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ante investment and ex post hold-up. The principal is S, the seller of a good, and the
agent is B, a potential buyer with ex ante uncertain valuation. B can undertake an
unobservable investment that raises his expected valuation but, without an ex ante
contract, he will fail to do so because of the hold-up threat.
B's investment costs I. If he does not invest his type is distributed according to
F 0 on 0 = [0; 
0
], and, if he does, it is distributed according to F 1 on 1 = [1; 
1
],
where 0  1  0  1 and F 1 rst-order stochastically dominates F 0. Both
distributions satisfy the increasing hazard rate condition. If B is of type  and buys
x units of the good for payment t then his payo is u(x)   t and S's payo is
t   cx, where u0 > 0, u00 < 0, and limx!0 u0(x) = 1. , once realized, is B's private
information.
Contracting Ex Post
Assume rst that there is no ex ante contract. Then S oers an incentive com-
patible and individually rational mechanism ex post (i.e., after B's type is realized)
that maximizes her expected payo, where her expectation depends on whether she
believes B to have invested or not. If S believes that B has invested she will oer a
quantity schedule xF
1
() that pointwise maximizes the virtual surplus
   1  F
1()
f 1()

u(x())  cx(); (1)
together with associated utilities U1() =
R 
1
u(xF
1
(s))ds. Of course, B will only
invest if his expected utility gain from investment justies the investment cost.
Contracting Ex Ante
If the investment cost is higher than B's expected gain, given the ex-post contract,
and if S wants B to invest, then she will need to design an ex ante contract which
takes investment incentives into account. We assume initially that S can commit
not to renegotiate. Then she will oer, before the investment stage, an incentive-
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compatible and interim individually rational contract,4 (xI(); U I()), that maximizes
S's expected payo (for belief F 1) subject to the investment constraint
Z 1
1
U()(dF 1   dF 0)  I: (2)
One can show that xI() pointwise maximizes \investment adjusted" virtual sur-
plus 
   1  F
1()
f 1()
+ 
F 0()  F 1()
f 1()

u(x())  cx(); (3)
where   0 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with (2). Since F 1 rst-order
stochastically dominates F 0, the term multiplying  is positive, so xI()  xF 1().
Example A Suppose that u(x) =
p
x, c = 1
2
, F 0 is uniform on 0 = [1; 3], and
F 1 is uniform on 1 = [2; 3]. The rst-best is x() = 2.
Then xF
1
() = (2   3)2 and U1() = 2   3 + 2. Since R 1
1
U1()(dF 1   dF 0) =
5=12, if I > 5=12 B will not invest without an ex ante contract. Assume that I = 0:5.
Then, using (3) and the binding investment constraint (2),
xI() =
9
4
(   1)2: (4)
This is illustrated in Figure 1 below. It can be checked that inducing investment
is optimal for S.
The above shows that there exist contexts in which the principal would like to im-
plement an outcome function which is neither ecient nor ex post optimal (in Section
4.5 we discuss other possible contexts for which this is the case). Furthermore she
would like to commit herself at an early stage to a contract which might subsequently
not be optimal. Our main focus, however, is on the case in which such commitment
is not possible.
4We maintain the assumption that the ex ante mechanism has to satisfy the participation con-
straint for each type of B: S cannot insist that B accepts the mechanism before learning his type,
for example because she is facing a population of anonymous buyers or because she cannot observe
the timing of the realization of B's type.
9
Renegotiation
Suppose that S has publicly announced, ex ante, the contract associated with
(xI ; U I) for Example A with I = 0:5 (a menu of quantity-transfer pairs f(x; t)g which
we can take to be equivalent to a direct revelation mechanism) and the investment
stage has passed. If B now places an order (x; t) this denes the guaranteed reserva-
tion outcome. However, in the light of what S has learned about B from his order,
S may now prefer a dierent outcome, which B may also prefer. In that case we
would expect some renegotiation to take place. Suppose then that S, after5 seeing
B's choice, can oer a new contract (mechanism) and B can either choose to play
the new mechanism or else stick with the reservation outcome (x; t). The question is:
what initial contract should S propose if she wants to implement (xI ; U I), bearing in
mind that she should expect the contract to be renegotiated?
We show in the following sections that this three-stage game of incomplete infor-
mation, beginning just before B sends a message in the ex ante mechanism (xI ; U I),
has a unique equilibrium outcome. Each type of B initially randomizes over all mes-
sages up to and including his true type; after any message S oers the initial (ex
ante) mechanism again; and B accepts the second mechanism and tells the truth. In
other words, B's initial randomization has the eect that S's beliefs always change
in such a way that her ex ante contract becomes ex post optimal. Therefore S does
not need to be concerned with the fact that renegotiation will take place - she can
design the initial contract exactly as if she could commit to it.
The equilibrium works as follows in Example A. Type  2 [; ] puts probability
(3   )(3   ^) 1 on messages in the interval [2; ^] (and zero probability on messages
^ > ), for any ^  . This implies that, given a message ^, S knows that B's type is
^ or higher and her belief about such types, G^(), has, by Bayes' Rule, a density of
the form h(^)(3   ). Therefore these conditional densities (varying the message ^)
5Our main focus below is on ex post renegotiation. Renegotiation could alternatively take place
at the interim stage, i.e. before B plays the pre-announced mechanism but after the type is realized,
S could oer a new mechanism to B. As we discuss below (Corollary 1), our results would also
apply to this case.
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are all scaled versions of each other, the scalar being h(^). Moreover, for any ^  ,
1 G^()
g^()
=
R 3

h(^)(3  u)du
h(^)(3  ) =
(3  )
2
: (5)
This in turn implies, using (1), that if S has belief G^() her optimal quantity schedule
is xI = (9=4)(  1)2. Furthermore, she will want to give utility U I(^) to type ^ since
she regards this type as the lowest possible one, and U I(^) is its reservation utility
after announcing ^ (telling the truth) in the original mechanism. This shows that,
after any message, the optimal ex post contract6 for S is (xI ; U I). After sending
an initial message ^ < , type  will then, in the second mechanism, recontract to
(xI(); tI()). Finally, B is happy to mix in the way described because he is indierent
between all messages.
In Example A, therefore, S's optimal ex ante contract can be implemented despite
renegotiation. This is not always the case. If a contract can be implemented in our
setting then, without loss of generality, B stochastically understates his type and the
ex ante mechanism must be optimal for S after any message (Proposition 1). This
implies that S's post-initial-message belief must be smaller than her prior F 1 in the
likelihood-ratio order (Proposition 2). Consequently, there is an upper bound on the
rate at which the quantity schedule x can increase (Proposition 3). The intuition for
this is as follows. S's post-message belief must be invariant to the message, up to
scaling, so each type of S must randomize in a proportionally similar way (i.e. two
types who both send messages ^ and ^0 must both weight them in the same ratio,
(3   ^0)2(3   ^) 2 in our example). This means that, given any message ^, and a
uniform prior, S's posterior density must be declining; she places more weight on low
types than on high ones because high ones randomize over a larger set of messages. In
this sense, B is conditionally pessimistic: although a given message implies that B's
type is above a certain threshold, above that threshold her belief is shifted downwards
compared with the uniform prior. Therefore the slope of S's optimal quantity schedule
is reduced: essentially, if low types are relatively more likely, she will want to induce a
6There is no loss of generality in assuming that S oers the whole mechanism, including those
outcomes intended for types below ^. See footnote 11 below.
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relatively lower degree of ineciency for those types (higher x) compared with types
just above.
Example B For an example in which S's ex ante optimal contract cannot be
implemented with renegotiation, suppose that everything is as in Example A except
that F 0 is some cumulative distribution with support 0 = [2; 3], and is rst-order
stochastically dominated by F 1, which, as before, is uniform on 1 = [2; 3]. Since
F 0(2) = F 1(2), (3) implies that xI(2) = xF
1
(2). For some higher values of  the
ex ante optimal schedule xI will be strictly greater than xF
1
, the optimum for belief
F 1. However, this implies that xI must somewhere increase faster than xF
1
which,
as just argued, is incompatible with the form of our equilibrium. Hence xI cannot be
implemented with renegotiation.
In summary, an ex ante contract can be implemented with renegotiation if and
only if it is optimal for some possible post-message beliefs of S. However, because
B always understates his true value the possible post-message beliefs of S are those
which are more pessimistic, that is, lower in the likelihood ratio order, than the prior
(see Corollary 2). Fig. 1 shows x; xF
1
and xI (labelled xIA and xIB respectively for
Examples A and B).
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3 The Model
A principal (P ) and an agent (A) must choose a decision x from the set [x; x]  <+,
and a money transfer t. The agent has a privately known type  which follows a
distribution F , with dierentiable density f > 0, on the interval  = [; ], where
 > 0. In addition, F satises the increasing-hazard-rate condition. Both players are
expected utility maximizers and have quasi-linear utility for money. If the decision
is x and A transfers t to P , then P 's payo is t   cx, where c > 0, and A's payo
is u(x; )   t, where u is a thrice-dierentiable function satisfying the conditions
ux > 0; uxx < 0; ux > 0, with subscripts denoting derivatives. We make two further
assumptions, (a) either uxx  0 or u(x; ) = u(x), and (b) @(uxx=ux)=@  0.
Assumption (a) together with the increasing-hazard rate condition for F guarantee
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that the second-best decision rule xF is unique and non decreasing.7 We discuss the
use of Assumption (b) at the end of this section. Finally, we make the assumption
that ux(x; ) > c > ux(x; ), which guarantees that, for each type, the ex post ecient
decision is interior.
The choice of decision and transfer is governed by a mechanism , i.e., a triple
(M;xM ; tM) consisting of a set of messages M , where M is a metric space, and a pair
of functions xM : M ! [x; x] and tM : M ! <. A chooses a message m 2 M . When
message m is sent, xM(m) is the contracted decision and tM(m) is the contracted
payment to be paid by A to P . We assume throughout that communication is direct
(there is no mediator).8 Denote the set of possible mechanisms by  . The mechanism
might be chosen either by P as in our hold-up example or by a third party. In
Section 4.5 we discuss applications involving third parties to which our analysis can
be applied. The reservation utility for each type of A is zero. In the case where there
is a third party who designs the initial mechanism we do not model the contracting
game and we therefore do not consider P 's reservation utility explicitly. Such an
analysis would have to include this as an additional constraint.
The parties are not able to commit not to renegotiate the mechanism. We assume
that at the renegotiation stage, after the play of the mechanism, all of the bargaining
power lies with the principal, the uninformed party.9 In other words, once the outcome
of the initial mechanism, (x; t), is known, the principal chooses a mechanism to oer
to the agent. A can either play this new mechanism or obtain the outcome (x; t). Our
aim is to characterize the set of outcome functions and corresponding utility schedules
which can be implemented by some mechanism taking into account the fact that the
mechanism can be renegotiated ex post.
We restrict attention to non-stochastic mechanisms throughout. Assumptions
(a) and (b) are sucient for P 's optimal contract oer at renegotiation to be non-
stochastic (see Proposition 8 of Jullien (2000)). They also imply that the optimal
7See for instance Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), p.263.
8For an analysis of contracting with renegotiation and mediated communication, see Goltsman
(2011) and Bester and Strausz (2007)
9If the agent had the bargaining power results analogous to ours would trivially hold.
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ex ante contract in the no-renegotiation case is deterministic in our hold-up example
above. There exist mechanism design problems10 for which the optimal contract is
stochastic; however, we do not consider these.
Strategies and Equilibrium
An initial mechanism (M;xM ; tM) and the post-mechanism stage together dene
a three-stage game of incomplete information: A sends a message; then P , after ob-
serving the message, oers a new mechanism; nally A plays the second mechanism or
chooses the default outcome resulting from his message. Call this game (M;xM ; tM).
We will consider the perfect Bayesian equilibria of this game.
Given an outcome (x; t) of the initial mechanism, and a mechanism  2   oered
by P , A either chooses the default outcome (x; t) or plays the mechanism . In a
perfect Bayesian equilibrium A will choose optimally given his type, i.e., will either
play the mechanism optimally or, if the default gives a higher payo, choose the latter.
Given her belief, P will, at the preceding stage (i.e., after an initial message), choose
a mechanism to oer to A which is optimal for P . We impose a regularity condition
on the possible equilibrium post-message beliefs of P : they must lie in 1(), the set
of distribution functions on  which have density functions except possibly at a nite
set of jump points (to our knowledge, the literature has not established the nature of
the optimal contract for other distributions).
Let DIC(x; t) be the set of incentive-compatible direct revelation mechanisms
which dominate the default outcome (x; t) for all types, i.e., mechanisms (; x; t) 2
  such that, for all ; 0 2 ,
u(x(); )  t()  u(x(0); )  t(0)
and
u(x(); )  t()  u(x; )  t:
It is straightforward to show, by a revelation principle argument, that we can
10See for example Maskin and Riley (1984) and Strausz (2006).
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assume without loss of generality that P chooses a mechanism in DIC(x; t) and that,
for all  2 , type  of A accepts the mechanism and tells the truth.11
Given the above, we can take a pure strategy for P in (M;xM ; tM) to be a
function sP : M !   such that, for m 2 M , sP (m) 2 DIC(xM(m); tM(m)). We only
consider equilibria in which P 's strategy is pure.12
Similarly, we can take a pure strategy for A in (M;xM ; tM) to be a function
which maps  to M . We take a mixed strategy for A to specify a mixed strategy
for each type of A, where a mixed strategy13 for type  of A is a probability measure
sA(:j) on M .
If P 's strategy is sP and A is type  2  and sends m 2 M , let the post-
renegotiation decision and transfer be denoted by x(m; sP ; ) and t(m; sP ; ); that is,
the mechanism sP (m) gives this outcome when the agent tells the truth.
Denition 1: A renegotiation equilibrium (or r-equilibrium) of (M;xM ; tM) is
a prole of strategies (sA; sP ), and, for each m 2M , a belief Gm 2 1(), such that
(i) for each  2 , sA(j) puts probability 1 on messages m which maximize
u(x(m; sP ; ); )  t(m; sP ; );
(ii) for each m 2M , sP (m) solves
max(;x;t)2DIC(x(m);t(m))
Z 

t()  cx()dGm();
11The standard argument would imply that P can oer a mechanism in DIC(x; t), but restricted
to types in the support of her belief. If instead she oers this kind of mechanism for the entire type
space, then types in the support of her belief will not want to choose any of the \extra" options, so
this makes no dierence to her. It is convenient to assume that she oers a mechanism dened on
all types in  because, as we show below, this implies that in equilibrium she will oer the original
mechanism again, rather than oering the original mechanism with gaps in the type space.
12Assumptions (a) and (b) imply that P 's optimal quantity schedule is unique (see Theorem
4 of Jullien (2000)), and so P never wants to mix over dierent direct revelation mechanisms at
renegotiation.
13It is possible to dene a continuum of mixed strategies over M via a distributional strategy
as in Milgrom and Weber (1985), i.e., a joint distribution on M   for which the marginal on 
corresponds to the prior F . sA(:j) is then the measure on M conditional on . See also Crawford
and Sobel (1982).
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(iii) for each m 2 supp(sA) 
S
2 supp(sA(:j)), Gm is consistent with Bayes'
Rule, given prior belief F and strategy sA.
Slightly abusing notation, we denote by (x(sA; sP ; ); t(sA; sP ; )) the nal out-
come, given , if the strategy prole is (sA; sP ). This may be stochastic if sA is
mixed.
Denition 2: (a) A function (X;T ) :  ! [x; x]  < is a r-implementable
outcome function if (i) U()  u(X(); )   T ()  0 for all  2 , and (ii) there
exists a mechanism (M;xM ; tM) such that, for all  2 , x(sA; sP ; ) = X() and
t(sA; sP ; ) = T () with probability 1 for some r-equilibrium (sA; sP ; fGmgm2M) of
(M;xM ; tM).
(b) (X;T ) is strongly r-implementable if, in addition, (X;T ) is the outcome of all
r-equilibria of (M;xM ; tM).
A utility schedule U : ! < is (strongly) r-implementable if U() = u(X(); ) 
T () for some (strongly) r-implementable (X;T ). The fact that the utility schedule
U must be non-negative reects the fact that A's outside utility has been normalized
to zero and we allow him not to participate in the mechanism.
We refer to an outcome function (and associated utility schedule) as c-implementable
if it can be implemented in the case in which the players can be committed not to rene-
gotiate the mechanism. By standard results (see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), Mil-
grom and Segal (2002)) (X;T ) is c-implementable if and only if X is non-decreasing,
and for all  2 , U()  U() = R 

u(X(~); ~)d~, and U()  0.14
Remark It is easy to show, using revelation principle arguments, that if (X;T )
(resp. U ) is r-implementable then (X;T ) (resp. U) is c-implementable.
The rst-best decision for  solves the problem maxx2[x;x]u(x; )   cx: By our
assumptions this has a unique solution which we denote by x(). Furthermore, x
is strictly increasing in . We assume that u(x(); )   cx() > 0 for all  so that
14A c-implementable U is absolutely continuous and a.e. dierentiable.
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there is strictly positive surplus for each type.
For future reference, we include two standard denitions of orderings of probability
distributions (see Shaked and Shanthikumar (1994)).
Denition 3: Given two distribution functions F and G, with density functions
f and g respectively, G is smaller than F in the likelihood ratio ordering, denoted
G LR F , if, for all 1  2,
g(2)f(1)  g(1)f(2):
In the case in which f and g are both dierentiable and f; g > 0, this corresponds to
the condition that, for all ,
g0()
g()
 f
0()
f()
;
i.e., that the proportional rate of growth of g is always less than that of f .
Denition 4: Given two distribution functions F and G, with density functions
f > 0 and g > 0 respectively, G is smaller than F in the hazard rate ordering, denoted
G HR F , if
1 G()
g()
 1  F ()
f()
for all .
4 Analysis
4.1 Renegotiation Invariance
It is straightforward to show that the ex post ecient decision schedule x is
r-implementable. Take an incentive-compatible direct revelation mechanism (x; t)
which would implement it in the no-renegotiation case. There is an equilibrium in
which each type tells the truth in this mechanism and, after any message , the
principal oers (x; t). This is an optimal oer because A's type is now common
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knowledge and so the default, (x(); t()), is known to be ecient. Equally, it is
easy to implement P 's optimal mechanism given belief F , denoted by (; xF ; tF ),
using a null initial mechanism - at the second stage P will choose (; xF ; tF ). The
questions we ask are: what other schedules are r-implementable, and how can they be
implemented? For examples of situations in which such a schedule would be desirable,
see the hold-up example in Section 2, or the discussion in Subsection 4.5. Henceforth
(X;T ) will refer to an outcome schedule other than the two described above.
Consider P 's optimal decision given belief G 2 1() and default outcome (x; t).
Denote the minimum and maximum of supp(G) (the support of G) by (G) and
(G) respectively. It is straightforward to show that if an incentive-compatible direct
revelation mechanism (; x; t) satises
u(x((G)); (G))  t((G))  u(x; (G))  t
then, for all  > (G),
u(x(); )  t()  u(x; )  t:
It follows that choosing P 's optimal (; x; t) 2 DIC(x; t) is payo-equivalent to
choosing P 's optimal incentive-compatible direct revelation mechanism for type space
supp(G) subject to the constraint that the payo of type (G) is at least u(x; (G)) t.
Therefore, by standard results, an optimal mechanism (; x; t) satises
x((G)) = x
((G));
x()  x() 8 2 supp(G);
and
u(x((G)); (G))  t((G)) = u(x; (G))  t:
Furthermore, the downward incentive constraints bind. Therefore, if  2 supp(G)
and 0 2 supp(G) for 0 >  but (; 0)  (supp(G))C then u(x(0); 0)   t(0) =
u(x(); 
0)  t().
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The Lemma below establishes that, in any r-equilibrium of any mechanism, the
nal (post-renegotiation) decisions satisfy the usual monotonicity property (message
by message). This is because the nal outcome schedule is incentive-compatible and
the utility functions are supermodular. It also establishes that the decisions are less
than or equal to the ecient decisions and (in part (iii)), using these two properties,
that decisions are deterministic - although a given type of A may randomize over
messages, each message in the support of his strategy will lead to the same nal
decision (and transfer). This Lemma, and all subsequent Lemmas and Propositions,
are to be understood as referring to almost all .
Lemma 1 Suppose that (sA; sP ; fGmgm2M) is a r-equilibrium of (M;xM ; tM),
where (M;xM ; tM) 2  .
(i) For any  and 0 > , if m 2 supp(sA(:j)) and m0 2 supp(sA(:j0)) then
x(m; sP ; )  x(m0; sP ; 0);
(ii) x(sA; sP ; )  x() w.pr.1;
(iii) Suppose m and m0 are both in supp(sA(:j)). Then x(m; sP ; ) = x(m0; sP ; )
and t(m; sP ; ) = t(m
0; sP ; ).
To see why part (iii) of the Lemma is true, suppose that x(m; sP ; ) > x(m
0; sP ; ).
In that case, x(m0; sP ; ) must be less than the ecient quantity for . This implies
that some higher types must also send message m0, otherwise, after m0,  would be
the top type and so would get an ecient quantity. This however, is incompatible
with monotonicity: some of these higher types would prefer to send m and obtain
x(m; sP ; ).
Fix a mechanism (M;xM ; tM) and a r-equilibrium (sA; sP ; fGmgm2M) of
(M;xM ; tM). Lemma 1 implies that for each  this equilibrium has a determin-
istic nal outcome (x(sA; sP ; ); t(sA; sP ; )). Dene an outcome schedule (X;T )
by X() = x(sA; sP ; ) and T () = t(sA; sP ; ), for  2 . This is an incentive-
compatible schedule, otherwise some type could protably deviate by imitating an-
other type over the three-stage game. Furthermore, after anym, the outcome schedule
which P proposes in sP (m) coincides with (X;T ) for types in supp(Gm).
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The next proposition gives a modied revelation principle. It shows that the same
outcome as is achieved in the given equilibrium (namely (X;T )) can also be achieved
by giving the parties, at the outset, the direct revelation mechanism (; X; T ).
Proposition 1 (Renegotiation Invariance) Suppose the outcome function (X;T )
is r-implementable. Then (X;T ) can be implemented by using as the initial mecha-
nism the direct revelation mechanism (; X; T ) whose outcomes coincide with those
specied by the function (X;T ). In the equilibrium of the game beginning with this
mechanism in place, each type  mixes over a subset of [; ], and, after observing
any message in , P oers the same mechanism, (; X; T ), but this time the agent
reports truthfully.
In the equilibrium of Proposition 1, Amust randomize over messages in such a way
that P 's optimal mechanism is always (; X; T ), no matter what message A sends.
This renegotiation-invariance property is distinct from the renegotiation-proofness
principle. In our setting the latter would say that our three-stage game can be
regarded as a single mechanism which is not renegotiated. By contrast, renegotiation-
invariance means that the outcome of the initial mechanism is in fact renegotiated in
equilibrium, but the nal outcome is the same as if renegotiation were not possible.
We have assumed that renegotiation takes place ex post. What if P , instead of
proposing a new mechanism after the initial one is played, may propose to replace
the latter with a new one before it is played but after A has learned his type? Then
it follows from Proposition 1 that in equilibrium, given mechanism (; X; T ), she will
refrain from renegotiation:
Corollary 1 If (X,T) is r-implementable then (X,T) is interim renegotiation-
proof.
Proof In the Appendix.
It remains to discover which outcome functions (X;T ) are r-implementable. We
examine this question in the following subsections.
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4.2 Necessary Conditions for r-implementability
Proposition 1 enables us to establish conditions which r-implementable decision
(and hence utility) schedules must satisfy, since the form of the equilibrium described
in the Proposition restricts the possible second-stage beliefs.
Together with Lemma 1, Proposition 1 implies that if (X;T ) is r-implementable
then X() = x() and X()  x() for all  2 . Furthermore, since (X;T )
must be incentive-compatible X must be non-decreasing. We maintain henceforth
the following assumption about X.
Assumption 1 X :  ! [x; x] satises X() < x() for all  <  and X() =
x().
The rst part of Assumption 1 is made to simplify the exposition and we discuss
its relaxation below. In this subsection we also require strict monotonicity:
Assumption 2 X : ! [x; x] is strictly increasing.
We relax this requirement in Proposition 5 in the next subsection, on sucient
conditions for r-implementability, to allow non-decreasing functions which have at
sections.
The next Lemma shows that, for (X;T ) such that X satises these two assump-
tions, any message ^ which is sent in the equilibrium described in Proposition 1 is
sent by all types above ^.
Lemma 2 Suppose (X;T ) is r-implementable and X satises Assumptions 1 and
2. Then (X;T ) is r-implemented by an equilibrium (sA; sP ; fGg2) of (; X; T )
in which, for all ^ 2 supp(sA), supp(G^) = [^; ].
Proof In the equilibrium described in Proposition 1, after message ^, P will opti-
mally oer a mechanism which gives the ecient outcome for (G^) = max(supp(G^)),
by eciency at the top. If (G^) <
 this implies that she doesn't oer (; X; T ).
Contradiction. Therefore (G^) =
 for any message ^ in the support of sA.
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Assume that the lowest type sending message ^ (i.e., (G^)) is  > ^. Then, type 
would get zero renegotiation surplus, hence would get payo u(X(^); )  T (^). But,
since X is strictly increasing and (X;T ) is incentive-compatible, type  could get
a higher utility by announcing  and then declining to renegotiate, a contradiction.
Therefore, (G^) = ^ for any message ^ in the support of sA.
Suppose that 1 2 supp(G^), 2 2 supp(G^), where 2 > 1 but (1; 2) \
supp(G^) = ;. Then, since downward incentive constraints bind in sP (^), type 2
is indierent between (X(1); T (1)) and (X(2); T (2)). But this contradicts the fact
that (X;T ) is incentive-compatible for the type set  and X is strictly increasing.
Hence, the support of P 's posterior belief is an interval. QED
Consider a schedule (X;T ) which satises the conditions in Lemma 2. (; X; T )
r-implements this outcome by means of an equilibrium (sA; sP ; fGg2), as in Propo-
sition 1. Since no type puts positive probability on messages above their true type 
is in the support of A's strategy sA. Let G denote P 's belief after message . Lemma
2 implies that supp(G) = . Furthermore, (X;T ) is optimal for P given belief G,
so (see Myerson (1981), Fudenberg and Tirole (1991)) X must point-wise maximize
virtual surplus
u(X(); )  1 G()
g()
u(X(); )  cX();
where g is the density of G. This expression is well-dened because G is continuous
and has a strictly positive density for all  < . If it had a mass point then the
optimal schedule X would be constant to its right;15 it would also be constant on any
interval on which the density were zero. In either case, contrary to our assumption,
X could not be strictly increasing. Therefore, for all  2 [; ),
1 G()
g()
=
(ux(X(); )  c)
ux(X(); )
: (6)
For future reference, note that the RHS of this expression is decreasing in X() if
X() < x().
15See Bergemann and Pesendorfer (2001) for an analysis of mechanism design for the case of type
distributions with both densities and mass points (only in the working paper version).
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Furthermore, take any other message ^ in the support of A's strategy. From
Lemma 2, the support of P 's belief G^ is [^;
]. Then it is again optimal for P to oer
(; X; T ), so for  2 [^; ],
1 G^()
g^()
=
1 G()
g()
: (7)
Moreover, G^ must be the same as G, scaled to the support [^;
], i.e.,
G^() =
G() G(^)
1 G(^) : (8)
As Lemma 3 below shows, (7) and (8), combined with the fact that each type
only sends messages below his true type, imply that the distribution G is smaller
than the distribution F in the likelihood ratio ordering and, therefore, in the hazard
rate ordering.
Lemma 3 (i) G LR F ; (ii) G HR F ; (iii) g is continuous.
The intuition for parts (i) and (ii) of Lemma 3 is given in Section 2 above. The
Lemma is key to deriving necessary and sucient conditions for r-implementability
of an outcome schedule (X;T ). We provide two kinds of characterization. One is
in terms of the type distribution for which the outcome function would be optimal
for the principal. This is given in Propositions 2 and 4 and Corollary 2. The other,
given in Propositions 3 and 5 and Corollary 3, is in terms of properties of the decision
function X, in particular that the slope of X must not be too high. Recall that xF
is P 's optimal decision schedule given belief F . Given G 2 1() and V 2 <, we
denote by  P (G; V )    the set of incentive-compatible direct revelation mechanisms
which are optimal for P if her belief about types is G and A's reservation utility is
V .
Proposition 2 Suppose that (X;T ), with associated utility schedule U , is r-
implementable and X satises Assumptions 1 and 2. Then (i) (; X; T ) 2  P (G;U())
for some G such that G LR F ; (ii) X()  xF () for all ; and (iii) X is continu-
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ous.
Proof (i) follows from Lemma 3(i) since (X;T ) is optimal for type distribution
G.
(ii) follows from Lemma 3(ii), (6), the corresponding equation for F , i.e.,
1  F ()
f()
=
ux(x
F (); )  c
ux(xF (); )
and the fact that the RHS of (6) is decreasing in X.
(iii) follows from Lemma 3(iii) and (6). QED
In the case in which X is dierentiable, we can identify restrictions which r-
implementability places on the rate at which X can increase.
Proposition 3 Suppose that (X;T ) is r-implementable and X satises Assump-
tions 1 and 2 and is dierentiable. Then
f 0()
f()
+ A(X(); ) +X 0()B(X(); )  0 (9)
for all  2 [; ), where
A(x; ) =
2ux(x; )
(ux(x; )  c)  
ux(x; )
ux(x; )
and
B(x; ) =
uxx(x; )
(ux(x; )  c)  
uxx(x; )
ux(x; )
:
Proof (i) By (6), if X is dierentiable then g is dierentiable. By Lemma 3(i),
f 0()
f()
  g
0()
g()
 0
for all  2 [; ), f 0 and g0 being understood as the right-hand derivative at the lower
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bound. Since
g0()
g()
=   g()
1 G()  
d
d
(1 G()
g()
)
1 G()
g()
(10)
it follows, using (6), that
g0()
g()
=  A(X(); ) X 0()B(X(); ):
QED.
The necessary condition (9) places an upper bound on the slope of X, the bound
depending locally on the prior and on the level of X. For some priors, this upper
bound is negative at certain points; in that case a strictly increasing X cannot be
implemented and so X would have to have a at section there. Consider the case in
which u(x; ) = u(x). Then the condition becomes
X 0()   u
0(X())(u0(X())  c)
cu00(X())
[
f 0()
f()
+
2u0(X())
(u0(X())  c) ]:
Since X() is strictly below the ecient level, u0(X())  c > 0. Therefore the right
hand side is negative if
f 0()
f()
+
2u0(X())
(u0(X())  c) < 0;
so (9) is harder to satisfy if f is falling fast.
We have assumed (Assumption 1) that X is strictly below the ecient level for all
 < . Suppose instead that (; ] is partitioned into open intervals (ai; bi) on which
X() < x() and closed intervals [bi; ai+1] on which X() = x(). In that case, if
(X;T ) is r-implementable then, in an equilibrium of the type described in Proposition
1, all types in any interval (bi; ai+1] tell the truth. A type  2 (ai; bi] randomizes in
a way which is similar to the case above but only over messages in (ai; ]. A result
analogous to Proposition 2 would hold, but separately for each interval (ai; bi). We
omit the details.
We have also assumed that X is a strictly increasing function. For the case in
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which X has intervals on which it is constant we do not know if the conditions
given in Proposition 2 are necessary. After every message the principal's belief must,
as above, be such that X is optimal. However, the optimal solution may involve
Myerson ironing, which depends on global properties of the type distribution, and
so the local characterization provided by (6) is not available for the at intervals.
Dierent messages could in principle give rise to the same optimal X despite beliefs
which are very dierent in nature. Nevertheless, such functions can be r-implemented
if they satisfy the conditions of Proposition 3, as we show in the next subsection.
4.3 Sucient Conditions for r-implementability
First we give a sucient condition which corresponds to Proposition 2, namely
that (X;T ) would be optimal for P if she had belief G, where G is any distribution
smaller than the prior in the likelihood ratio ordering.
Proposition 4 Suppose that (X;T ), with associated utility schedule U  0, is
such that (; X; T ) 2  P (G;U()) for some type distribution G 2 1() such that
G LR F . Suppose also that X satises Assumptions 1 and 2 and is dierentiable.
Then (X;T ) is r-implementable.
The proof is constructive. In the equilibrium, type 's message strategy is given
by the distribution function
sA([; ^]j) = g()
f()
f(^)
g(^)
for ^  , which ensures that P 's posterior belief is proportional to G after every
message.
Combining Propositions 2 and 4 gives
Corollary 2 Given X which is dierentiable and satises Assumptions 1 and 2,
(X;T ), with associated utility schedule U , is r-implementable if and only if U()  0
27
and (; X; T ) 2  P (G;U()) for some G such that G LR F .
The next proposition gives sucient conditions on X which correspond to the
necessary conditions in Proposition 3. Again, the proof is constructive. In the con-
structed equilibrium, the message strategy of type  is given by the distribution
function
sA([; ^]j) = f(^)
f()
exp[ 
Z 
^
z(v)dv];
where z(v) = A(X(v); v) +X 0(v)B(X(v); v) for v 2 .
Proposition 5 Suppose an incentive-compatible and individually rational schedule
(X;T ) is such that X is dierentiable and satises Assumption 1 and condition (9).
Then (X;T ) is r-implementable.
Combining this with Proposition 3,
Corollary 3 Given X which is dierentiable and satises Assumptions 1 and 2,
an incentive-compatible and individually rational schedule (X;T ) is r-implementable
if and only if it satises condition (9).
Proposition 5 establishes that any schedule (X;T ) which satises the necessary
conditions can be implemented by simply giving the parties the incentive-compatible
direct revelation mechanism which implements the schedule in the case in which
renegotiation is impossible. The next Proposition shows that, in the game dened
by this mechanism, the equilibrium described above is essentially unique - in any
equilibrium of the game, the outcome is (X;T ).
Proposition 6 Suppose that (X;T ) is an incentive-compatible and individually
rational schedule such that X is dierentiable and satises Assumptions 1 and 2 and
condition (9). Then the game (; X; T ) has a unique equilibrium outcome. That is,
(X;T ) is strongly r-implementable.
A sketch of the proof of Proposition 6 is as follows (the full proof is in the Ap-
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pendix). Let U be the utility schedule associated with (X;T ). Suppose that there is
some other equilibrium of (; X; T ) with equilibrium utility schedule ~U . Call this
equilibrium (~sA; ~sP ; ~G) and let its outcome schedule be ( ~X; ~T ). If ~U = U then it
follows by incentive compatibility of ~U and U that ( ~X; ~T ) = (X;T ), so assume that
~U 6= U .
Step 1. ~U()  U() for all  2 . This is because any type  has the option to
tell the truth in (; X; T ) and then decline to renegotiate, giving him a payo of
U().
Suppose, for example, that ~U and U coincide for types up to 1 and for all higher
types ~U is strictly higher than U . This implies that, for  > 1,
~U()  U() =
Z 
1
u( ~X(v); v)dv  
Z 
1
u(X(v); v)dv > 0: (11)
Step 2. No type sends any message in (1; ]. This follows from the argument
in the proof of Lemma 2. The lowest type sending such a message  would be .
Having sent this message this type would then get his default payo U(). But our
assumption is that ~U() > U(), so it cannot be part of 's equilibrium strategy to
send message .
In the equilibrium corresponding to ~U we can assume without loss of generality
that after any message P oers the mechanism (; ~X; ~T ). This means that it would
be optimal for P to oer this mechanism to types above 1 if the default outcome were
(X(1); T (1)) and she knew only that the message was in the set [; 1]. However,
P 's updated belief, conditional on this set of messages, about types in (1; ] is F
conditional on (1; ]. This is because, by Step 2, these types only send messages in
[; 1]. So ~X must equal x
F (P 's ex ante optimal schedule) for types above 1. Hence,
by Proposition 2(ii), X()  ~X() for  2 (1; ). However, by (11), this contradicts
our assumption that ~U > U on the interval (1; ].
4.4 The Linear Case
One leading case, treated in an earlier version of this paper, is the bilateral trade
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model, in which P is the seller of a unit quantity of a divisible good and A is a buyer,
type  of whom has utility x for quantity x. So [x; x] = [0; 1] and u(x; ) = x.
Furthermore, assume that c < , so that the ecient quantity for all types is equal
to 1. The seller's optimal schedule xF is a step function corresponding to a posted
price mechanism, where xF is equal to zero below  and equal to 1 above , with
 maximizing the seller's revenue function R() = (  c)(1  F ()). Hence, neither
x nor xF is strictly increasing.
Our main results above apply also to this case. The necessary condition (9) in
Proposition 3 becomes f 0() + 2f()  0. Since this is independent of X 0(), any
increasing function X such that X() = 1 for all    can be r-implemented
as long as this condition is satised by the prior. The condition is equivalent to
concavity of P 's revenue function R(), which in turn is implied by the increasing
hazard rate assumption on F . The density of the mixed strategy dened in the
proof of Proposition 5 becomes in this case (f(^)(^)2)(f()2) 1 for types  below
a critical value 0, and higher types have the same strategy as type 0, where 0 =
fmin jX() = 1g  . It is straightforward to show that the principal's updated
belief G is such that16
1 G()
g()
=    c;
and so virtual utility is the same for all types. Therefore P is indierent between all
incentive-compatible mechanisms for which the individual rationality constraint binds
at the bottom. Hence it is optimal for her to oer the initial mechanism (; X; T )
again. Although, for generic beliefs, only posted price mechanisms are optimal for P ,
the beliefs which arise endogenously in equilibrium are the non-generic ones which
justify the given mechanism.
4.5 Discussion
In Section 2 we presented one setting to which our analysis applies. Here we
outline several additional ones and discuss some of our main assumptions. The initial
16For   0: for higher types the game is over, since the initial mechanism has to give quantity
1 to them.
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mechanism could be designed by the principal, as in our hold-up example, or by a
third party such as a social planner. If the mechanism is chosen by the principal,
the question arises why she would not simply have a null contract initially and then
implement her optimal schedule xF . In other words, why should we be interested in
r-implementability of any other schedules?
As we have seen in the case of the hold-up example, an ex ante contract serves to
give investment incentives that an ex post contract fails to provide. For a dierent
example, consider the case of a rm, the principal, seeking to hire a new employee,
the agent. The initial mechanism corresponds to an announced labor contract that
is designed to attract applications from potential workers. There are various reasons
why a null initial contract might be strictly suboptimal. One possibility is that
workers have a xed cost a > 0 of applying to the rm (i.e. of taking part in
the mechanism) and the announced contract therefore has to incorporate a type-
independent rent. If the initial contract were null, the principal's optimal mechanism
after the worker has arrived would leave the lowest types with utility below the
reservation level of 0 since a is sunk. In this case the principal's optimal mechanism
would be (; xF ; tF   a), but she would have to announce it in advance, and be
legally obliged to honor it, which introduces the problem that it may be vulnerable to
renegotiation after the worker has arrived. A richer set of optimal (for the principal)
schedules could arise if workers have type-dependent reservation utilities, given, for
example, by employment contracts which they could obtain from another rm. If
this outside option is no longer available once the worker has arrived at the principal
then, again, the principal would be obliged to announce her mechanism in advance.
Her optimal mechanism in this case may be very dierent from (; xF ; tF ).
Alternatively, the initial mechanism may be chosen by a third party. For example
suppose this third party is a regulator, the principal is a rm and the agent a potential
buyer. The regulator wishes to maximize the weighted sum of the buyer's expected
utility and the seller's expected prots and so chooses a mechanism (; x; t) that
maximizes
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Z 

[U() + ()] dF;
for some  > 1, where () is the rm's prot and U() = u(x())   t() is buyer
type 's utility. Using standard arguments, the optimal schedule xR

solves
 +
1  

1  F ()
f()

u0(xR

()) = c;
which implies that
x()  xR()  xF ():
As in the previous examples, the optimal initial mechanism is neither the principal's
preferred mechanism, nor the ecient one. Nor, in general, is it a convex combination
of those two mechanisms.
In another similar example, the planner is the headquarters of the rm. The
division (principal) aims to maximize its own prots; the headquarters, however, is
interested both in the prot which the division makes from a particular buyer (agent)
but also in the prots to be made from this buyer by its other divisions in the future.
This prot may depend both on the type of the buyer and, because, say, of learning
eects, on the quantity consumed by the buyer, which aects future willingness-to-
pay.
The Form of Renegotiation
In the case in which the initial mechanism is chosen by a planner, we do not need
to assume that he can oblige the parties to use his mechanism. Instead, both parties
have a legal right to take part in it. Would the principal, if she could, oer a dierent
mechanism to be played in stage 1 instead of the planner's mechanism? We have
already shown (Corollary 1) that she would not oer one after the agent's type is
realized. In the hold-up example of Section 2 the agent does not know his type at
the outset, so the question of ex ante renegotiation arises - would the principal want
to propose a new mechanism before the type is realized (but after the investment
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stage)? We rule this out by assumption, on the grounds that it is unlikely in most
applications that the principal could observe the timing of this realization, and the
agent would have an incentive not to reveal it.
Our formulation assumes that after the initial mechanism is played the subsequent
bargaining takes the form of an ultimatum game. Our results extend to a model in
which there are nitely many stages at which the principal makes a renegotiation
proposal and there is no discounting. In an equilibrium17 of that game, after the
agent's initial message, the principal always oers the initial mechanism again on the
equilibrium path and a type- agent accepts a new mechanism before the nal stage
only if it oers a utility strictly higher than U(). At the nal stage the agent accepts
and reveals his type as in our analysis above.
In these formulations of the bargaining game there is typically some unrealized
surplus after the play has ended. For an illustration of the kind of situation for which
this is an appropriate model, consider the hold-up example of Section 2. The seller
and buyer meet at date t and the buyer places an order, i.e., chooses a contract from
the menu which the seller pre-announced before the investment stage, and after date
t there is an exogenous nite amount of time by which trade must be completed.
This could be because the good is perishable or because at some point it will become
obsolete as a result of external competition. Alternatively, it may be that the seller
has an exogenous production window available for this buyer after which other more
protable options will appear. In such a situation, when there is incomplete infor-
mation, it is natural that in the post-mechanism bargaining game some ineciency
remains at the end of the game, i.e., after the deadline.
Could the principal avoid the renegotiation problem by proposing the initial mech-
anism only at the last minute before the deadline? In our hold-up example, it is easy
to see that this is not possible, since the initial mechanism must be announced before
the investment stage, otherwise the buyer would have the wrong investment incen-
tives. In the case in which the designer is a third party, it may be that she cannot
observe the precise time at which P and A meet, or the date of the subsequent dead-
17Other equilibria are outcome-equivalent.
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line. This is particularly likely to be the case when the planner is designing a general
mechanism for a population of principals and agents. It might be argued that the
principal could propose to delay and play the planner's mechanism at the deadline;
however, the agent would have no incentive to agree, since renegotiation cannot harm
him and in principle could benet him. A further possibility is that the initial mecha-
nism, though announced some time before the deadline, could itself stipulate, in order
to obviate renegotiation, that it must not be played until just before the deadline.
This would be dicult to enforce because, as just noted, the exact date of the dead-
line may not be observable to third parties. Moreover, the mechanism would still be
vulnerable to interim renegotiation.
Even if there is no exogenous deadline it may be the case that the principal is
able to commit to her second-stage mechanism. This is implicitly assumed in most of
the literature on principal-agent theory, in which the ultimatum game is standardly
adopted. In that case, if there is a third-party designer, our assumption is that the
designer cannot fully commit the principal to her initial mechanism. There are many
settings in which a third party nds it harder to commit another person than it is for
that person to commit herself.
We assume that the planner cannot prevent renegotiation by, for example, de-
stroying any remaining quantities of the good (in case the principal is a seller and the
agent a buyer) or by taxing away the principal's surplus from renegotiation. Physi-
cally destroying remaining quantities might be impossible if the planner cannot verify
at what point his mechanism has been executed. Similarly, in order to tax the prin-
cipal's surplus the planner would have to be able to verify if renegotiation has taken
place, which might be dicult if parties' renegotiation agreements are silent or can be
claimed to form part of an entirely new contractual agreement between the principal
and the agent (for a further discussion, see Hart and Moore (1999)).
Finally, we conjecture that our results will extend in some form to models in which
the post-mechanism bargaining takes the form of an innite-horizon bargaining game
with discounting. Consider the bilateral trade case with linear utility outlined in
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subsection 4.4. Suppose that the initial mechanism is a direct revelation mechanism18
in which the buyer announces his type and the outcome for announcement  is a
contract according to which the buyer receives the good at time () and pays a price
p(). Suppose also that the bargaining is in discrete time and the uninformed party
makes all the oers. Our conjecture is that it is possible to r-implement any outcome
function which corresponds to an equilibrium  of the bargaining game for a belief
which is lower in the likelihood ratio order than the prior, and that this is achieved,
as in our analysis above, by giving the parties the corresponding direct revelation
mechanism, and by a mixed strategy of the buyer which, after any message, gives an
updated belief which supports, in the subsequent bargaining equilibrium, the outcome
of . The derivation of the buyer's mixed strategy would have to be substantially
more complicated than in our analysis above because the property that beliefs after
dierent messages are scaled versions of each other would no longer hold, otherwise
the rate at which the seller would subsequently screen would vary with the buyer's
message. We leave the exploration of these generalizations to future work.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1 (i) Since m is optimal for  and m0 is optimal for 0,
u(x(m; sP ; ); )  t(m; sP ; ))  u(x(m0; sP ; 0); )  t(m0; sP ; 0)
and
u(x(m0; sP ; 0); 0)  t(m0; sP ; 0)  u(x(m; sP ; ); 0)  t(m; sP ; ):
Therefore, since ux > 0 and ux > 0, x(m
0; sP ; 0)  x(m; sP ; ).
(ii) Let M 0() = fm 2 M jx(m; sP ; ) > x()g: By standard results, for any m,
P 's optimal schedule given Gm satises x(m; sP ; )  x() for all  2 supp(Gm).
18Cramton (1985) refers to this as a direct revelation sequential bargaining mechanism.
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Hence, if m 2M 0() then  =2 supp(Gm). But
pr(f(;m) 2 M j =2 supp (Gm)andm 2 supp (sA(:j))g = 0;
where pr refers to the joint distribution derived from F and sA. Therefore prf 2
jsA(M 0()j) > 0g = 0.
(iii) Suppose x(m; sP ; ) > x(m
0; sP ; ). Then Lemma 1(ii) implies that x(m0; sP ; ) <
x(), and so  < (Gm0). There are two cases to consider. (a) there exists 1 =
minf~ > j~ 2 supp(Gm0)g. (b) there exists a sequence fig1i=1  supp(Gm0) and
fig1i=1 # .
Case (a): downward incentive constraints bind for the mechanism sP (m
0) so
u(x(m0; sP ; 1); 1)  t(m0; sP ; 1) = u(x(m0; sP ; ); 1)  t(m0; sP ; ): (12)
But  is indierent between m and m0, so
u(x(m0; sP ; ); )  t(m0; sP ; ) = u(x(m; sP ; ); )  t(m; sP ; ):
Since 1 >  and x(m; sP ; ) > x(m
0; sP ; ), this last equation, together with super-
modularity, implies
u(x(m; sP ; ); 1)  t(m; sP ; ) > u(x(m0; sP ; ); 1)  t(m0; sP ; ):
So, by (12),
u(x(m; sP ; ); 1)  t(m; sP ; ) > u(x(m0; sP ; 1); 1)  t(m0; sP ; 1);
which contradicts optimality of message m0 for 1.
Case (b). By Lemma 1(i), x(m; sP ; )  x(m0; sP ; i) for all i 2 fig1i=1: There is
no loss of generality in taking sP (m
0) to be right-continuous. This implies x(m0; sP ; ) 
x(m; sP ; ). Contradiction. QED
36
Proof of Proposition 1 Let (sA; sP ; fGmgm2M) be an r-equilibrium of (M;xM ; tM)
which r-implements the given outcome function (X;T ). Take a message m which is in
the support of sA. After this message is sent the default outcome is (xM(m); tM(m))
and P 's belief is Gm. The minimum of the support of Gm is (Gm). For brevity we
refer to (Gm) as m.
As argued above, the outcome function which is given by sP (m) must coincide
with (X;T ) for types in the support of Gm. Therefore (; X; T ) is optimal for P given
belief Gm subject to the constraint that type m gets at least u(xM(m); m)  tM(m).
It follows that
(*) (; X; T ) is optimal for P given belief Gm subject to the constraint
that type m gets at least u(X(m); m)  T (m).
Now suppose that the initial mechanism is (; X; T ). In (; X; T ), A's strategy
is dened by the two-step procedure:
(i) select a message m in M using the strategy sA;
(ii) given m, announce m, the lowest type which sends m according to sA.
P 's strategy is: oer (; X; T ) after any message. P 's beliefs are derived via Bayes'
Rule.
This prole clearly implements the schedule (X;T ). To see that it is an equi-
librium, note rst that A is indierent between all type announcements since any
message leads to the same schedule and all possible defaults belong to this schedule.
Therefore A's strategy is optimal. Next, consider P 's strategy. Initially, suppose that
P can observe the message m chosen by A in stage (i) of his strategy, in addition
to his type announcement. Then P 's belief is Gm, with lower bound of support m.
The default outcome is (X(m); T (m)). Therefore, by (*), it is optimal for P to oer
(; X; T ). In fact, P only observes the message , not m. However, P knows that
m lies in the set fmjm = g and, as just shown, (; X; T ) is optimal for each such
m. Therefore P 's strategy is optimal and so the given strategies and beliefs form an
equilibrium.
The fact that, for anym chosen at stage (i) of his strategy, A announces the lowest
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type who would send m implies that he never announces a type above his true type.
QED
Proof of Corollary 1 In the interim-renegotiation case, given (X;T ) and as-
sociated U , P proposes an incentive compatible direct revelation mechanism that
satises A's participation constraint given by U^()  U() for all . In the ex-
post renegotiation case, in the equilibrium of Proposition 1 P 's optimal mecha-
nism is (; X; T ) after every message m when the reservation utility is given by
u(X(m); ) T (m). Therefore, it is also the optimal mechanism when the reservation
utility is U()  u(X(m); )   T (m). Since this is true for every message, the same
statement is true before observing the message. Hence (; X; T ) solves P 's interim
problem. QED
Proof of Lemma 3 (i) Take 2 > 1 > . Then the distribution over  conditional
on messages up to 1 is, by Bayes' Rule,
G(2j[; 1]) =
R 2

sA([; 1]j)f()dR 

sA([; 1]j)f()d
:
The denominator is strictly positive because types only send messages below them.
The integrals are well-dened because of our assumption that mixed strategies are
derived from distributional strategies.
Dierentiating w.r.t. 2,
g(2j[; 1]) = sA([; 1]j2)f(2)R 

sA([; 1]j)f()d
;
so
g(2j[; 1])
g(1j[; 1]) =
sA([; 1]j2)f(2)
sA([; 1]j1)f(1) : (13)
By (8), which applies except on a set of sA-measure zero,
g(2j[; 1]) =
R 1

g^(2)dsA(^)
sA([; 1])
=
g(2)
sA([; 1])
Z 1

(1 G(^)) 1dsA(^);
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where sA is the measure over messages, i.e. sA([; 1]) =
R 

sA([; 1]j)f()d:
Hence
g(2j[; 1])
g(1j[; 1]) =
g(2)
g(1)
;
so, from (13),
g(2)
g(1)
=
sA([; 1]j2)f(2)
sA([; 1]j1)f(1) :
This proves (i) since sA([; 1]j2)  sA([; 1]j1) = 1.
(ii) follows because if G is smaller than F in the likelihood ratio ordering then it
is also smaller in the hazard rate ordering (see Shaked and Shanthikumar (1994)).
(iii) Since G LR F and f is continuous, g cannot jump up. If it jumps down
then, by (6), X must jump down because the RHS of (6) is decreasing in X. This
contradicts the fact that X is non-decreasing. QED
Proof of Proposition 4 (; X; T ) 2  P (G;U()) implies that G has a strictly
positive density g. We construct an equilibrium of the type described in Proposition
1 which implements (X;T ). The initial mechanism is (; X; T ). (i) P 's strategy is to
oer (; X; T ) again after any message. (ii) Each type  has a mixed strategy with
support [; ] and a mass point on , given by the distribution function
sA([; ^]j) = g()
f()
f(^)
g(^)
for ^   and sA([; ^]j) = 1 for ^ > . (iii) After message ^, P 's belief about types
is given by G conditional on   ^.
The distribution in (ii) is well-dened because G LR F implies that sA is non-
decreasing and sA([; ]j) = 1. Furthermore, by the argument in the proof of Lemma
3(iii), sA is continuous.
Since X is dierentiable, (6) applied to G implies that g is dierentiable. The
density of the mixed strategy of type  is
A(^j) = g()
f()
f(^)
g(^)
"
f 0(^)
f(^)
  g
0(^)
g(^)
#
:
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The fact that F has no mass points and sA is continuous implies that G^ is
continuous for every message ^. Bayes' Rule implies that P 's belief over types in
[^; ] after message ^ is given by
G^() =
R 
^
A(^jv)f(v)dvR 
^
A(^jv)f(v)dv
=
R 
^
g(v)dvR 
^
g(v)dv
=
G() G(^)
1 G(^) :
This shows that the principal's beliefs are correct after every message. Given those
beliefs, applying (6), it is optimal for P to oer (; X; T ) again after any message.
A's strategy is optimal because every message leads to the same oered schedule
(X;T ), so he is indierent between all messages. This shows that the strategies form
an equilibrium. QED.
Proof of Proposition 5 As in the proof of Proposition 4, we construct an equilib-
rium for initial mechanism (; X; T ) which r-implements (X;T ).
Let z() = A(X(); ) + X 0()B(X(); ). (i) P 's strategy is to oer (; X; T )
again after any message. (ii) The mixed strategy of type  of A, sA(:j), is given by
the distribution function
sA([; ^]j) = f(^)
f()
exp[ 
Z 
^
z(v)dv]
for ^   and sA([; ^]j) = 1 for ^ > . By (9)  z() is bounded, so the integral is
well-dened. The density is then
A(^j) = 1
f()
[exp( 
Z 
^
z(v)dv)][f 0(^) + f(^)z(^)]:
This distribution is well-dened because f 0(^) + f(^)z(^)  0 by (9).
(iii) Given message ^ 2 , P 's belief (c.d.f) is
G^() =
R 
^
exp[  R v
^
z(w)dw]dvR 
^
exp[  R v
^
z(w)dw]dv
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for ^   and G^() = 0 for ^ > .
Note that if 1 < 2 < 
sA([; 1]j)
sA([; 2]j) =
f(1)
f(2)
exp[ 
Z 2
1
z(v)dv];
which is independent of , so that any two types  and 0 randomize in the same way,
proportionally, over the set of messages below min[; 0]. This is the property which
ensures that the principal's posterior distribution is invariant, apart from scaling, to
the message.
To see that this is an equilibrium, note rst that, by Bayes' rule, the conditional
density after message ^ of type   ^ is
g^() =
A(^j)f()R 
^
A(^jv)f(v)dv
=
exp[  R 
^
z(w)dw]R 
^
exp[  R v
^
z(w)dw]dv
;
so P 's beliefs are correct given A's strategy. A's strategy is optimal because every
message leads to the same oered schedule (X;T ), so he is indierent between all
messages. It remains to show that P 's optimal mechanism is (; X; T ) after every
message, i.e., that
1 G^()
g^()
=
(ux(X(); )  c)
ux(X(); )
for every message ^ 2  and every   ^.
Let for all v  ^, k^(v) =
R v
^
z(w)dw. Then
1 G^()
g^()
=
R 

exp[ k^(v)]dv
exp[ k^()]
;
so we need to show thatZ 

exp[ k^(v)]dv = exp[ k^()]
(ux(X(); )  c)
ux(X(); )
: (14)
For  = , the LHS of (14) is zero, and the RHS is also zero since ux(X(); )  c = 0
by eciency at the top. The derivative of the LHS with respect to  is  exp[ k^()].
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The derivative of the RHS is
e k^()( k0
^
())
(ux   c)
ux
+ e k^()
ux[uxxX
0() + ux]  (ux   c)[ux + uxxX 0()]
(ux)2
;
where arguments (X(); ) have been omitted for brevity. Since k0
^
() = z(), this is
equal to  exp[ k^()] and so (14) is true for all . This shows that P 's strategy is
optimal. QED.
Proof of Proposition 6 Let U be the utility schedule associated with (X;T ).
By standard results,
U() = U() +
Z 

u(X(v); v)dv: (15)
Therefore, if every equilibrium of (; X; T ) has the same utility schedule then
every equilibrium gives the same outcome, namely (X(); T ()), to each type , since
ux > 0. Suppose then that there is an equilibrium with utility schedule ~U 6= U . Call
this equilibrium (~sA; ~sP ; ~G). Since any type  is able to tell the truth in (; X; T )
and decline to renegotiate, giving U(), it must be that ~U()  U() for all  2 .
By Proposition 1, we can assume without loss of generality that in the strategy
prole (~sA; ~sP ) P oers (; ~X; ~T ) after any message, where ( ~X; ~T ) is the outcome
implemented by (~sA; ~sP ; ~G).
Let 1 = inf(j ~U() > U()) and let 2 = inf(j > 1; ~U() = U()) unless
~U() > U() for all  > 1, in which case let 2 = .
(a) Assume that 2 < .
Then ~U() > U() for all  2 (1; 2), ~U(1) = U(1) and ~U(2) = U(2), by
continuity of ~U and U . Since, for  2 supp(~sA), min[supp( ~G)] =  it follows that,
for  2 (1; 2),  =2 supp(~sA), otherwise  would be the lowest type to send message
, hence ~U() = U(). So no type in (1; 2) sends any message in (1; 2).
Since P oers (; ~X; ~T ) after any message, ( ~X; ~T ) is optimal for P conditional
on the set of messages [; 1]. Let P 's probability distribution conditional on this set
be denoted by ~G1. Then, for  2 (1; 2), ~G1 must have a density ~g1 and ~g1() is
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proportional to f() since types in (1; 2) only send messages in [; 1]. Hence, by
(6) and the argument in the proof of Proposition 3, ~X is dierentiable on (1; 2) and
f 0()
f()
=  A( ~X(); )  ~X 0()B( ~X(); )
for  2 (1; 2).
By Lemma 3,
g0()
g()
 f
0()
f()
:
So
 A( ~X(); )  ~X 0()B( ~X(); )   A(X(); ) X 0()B(X(); )
for  2 (1; 2). Hence, if ~X() = X(); ~X 0()  X 0(). For small enough " > 0,
~U() > U() for  2 (1; 1 + "). Therefore ~X() > X() for  2 (1; 1 + ") by (15).
Therefore, since ~X 0  X 0 whenever ~X = X,
Z 2
1
u( ~X(); )d >
Z 2
1
u(X(); )d;
which contradicts ~U(2) = U(2).
(b) Now assume that 2 = , so that ~U() > U() for all  2 (1; ].
According to the equilibrium strategy ~sA, types in (1; ] only send messages in
[; 1], so, conditional on this set of messages, P 's belief ~G1 satises
1  ~G1()
~g1()
=
1  F ()
f()
for  > 1. Also ( ~X; ~T ) is optimal for P given this belief so
1  F ()
f()
=
ux( ~X(); )  c
ux( ~X(); )
:
From Lemma 3
1  F ()
f()
 1 G()
g()
=
ux(X(); )  c
ux(X(); )
;
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so X()  ~X() for  2 (1; ) since ux > 0. By (15) this contradicts the fact that
~U() > U() on this interval. QED
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